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Abstract
The principles of equality and equity, respectively in
the Bill of Rights and the white paper on health,
provide the moral and legalfoundations forfuture
health care for children in South Africa. However,
given extreme health care need and scarce resources,
the government faces formidable obstacles if it hopes
to achieve a just allocation ofpublic health care
resources, especially among children in need of highly
specialised health care. In this regard, there is a
dearth of moral analysis which is practically useful
in the South African situation. We offer a set of
moral considerations to guide the macro-allocation of
highly specialised public health care services among
South Africa's children. We also mention moral
considerations which should inform micro-allocation.
(J7ournal ofMedical Ethics 1999;25:224-229)
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In South Africa, the focus of public medicine has
shifted to provision of primary health care
services, leaving the funding of highly specialised
health care in a state of uncertainty. How should
the South African government discharge its
constitutional and moral obligations in respect of
advanced public medical care for children?
Moral and legal commitments
In its white paper, the Department of Health pro-
vides the moral underpinnings of future health
care for children. In addition to equity, defined as
"(T)he universal provision of services on the basis
of need rather than any other criterion",' the gov-
ernment believes the "...moral and ethical basis
for the provision ofMCWH (maternal, child and
women's health)" should be in keeping with inter-
nationally agreed upon principles in the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.2
Services must also be "... efficient, cost-effective
and of a good quality".3
Correspondingly, the Bill of Rights in the con-
stitution entitles every child under 18 to basic
nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and
social services.4 The government has yet to define
"basic health care services" to which each child is
legally (and morally) entitled. "Basic health care
services" could, for example, refer only to a fixed
package of primary health care services' available
for all children, or it could also include health
care for children with special needs which may be
relatively rare and costly to treat but are
nevertheless basic in the sense of being necessary
for survival and adequate functioning. Such care,
tailored to the needs of identified specialties,
could be viewed as essential highly specialised
care, or the tertiary equivalent of essential
primary health care. The scope of the definition
of "basic health care services" will have crucial
implications for children with special needs.
Children's socio-economic rights enjoy special
protection in the constitution since they are con-
sidered "clear, near-absolute core entitlements"6
which could receive priority were the judiciary
called upon to allocate economic resources to
guarantee these rights.7
In practice, the government has taken steps to
improve children's health care. For example, the
introduction of free health care for all children
under six and pregnant women,' improved vacci-
nation coverage and extensive clinic-upgrading
programmes should lead to considerable reduc-
tions in morbidity and mortality from acute, gen-
erally preventable, diseases. In turn, the govern-
ment is proposing that unique and highly
specialised health care services for children with
complex conditions be limited to ten centrally
funded hospitals which will be considered na-
tional resources. Access to these services will be
on the basis of "need and non-discrimination"
and, to this end, the white paper singles out "... the
poorest patients" and "... those outside the imme-
diate geographical location of the facilities".9
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Agreement on definitions of highly specialised
health care services, and a formula for their fund-
ing, is being negotiated between the national and
regional departments of health. These services are
likely to include the following characteristics: low
patient volume, high cost per patient, significant
economies of scale, better results with large units,
and requiring a complex team ofpeople to provide
long term follow-up care (Department of Health,
unpublished communication, 1996). Clearly, it
will not be possible to provide these services to
everyone who might benefit from them, making
rationing inevitable.
Against this background of extreme health care
need, scarce resources, and a commitment to
seemingly conflicting moral demands of equal
constitutional rights, equity, efficiency, cost-
effectiveness and quality, how might the govern-
ment achieve a just allocation ofpublic health care
resources for children? We offer a set of moral
considerations that, if acted upon, would bring
these commitments together coherently and give
practical expression to the constitutional right of
children to highly specialised health care services
and to the government's commitment to equity.
The considerations we propose are not the
outcome of a philosophical thought-experiment
about what rational choosers might decide behind
a veil of ignorance in some original position,'0
even though such intellectual exercises yield
important normative insights. Instead, the frame-
work for our discussion is set by the factual egali-
tarian commitments in the Bill of Rights and the
white paper on health, and the realities of great
need and scarcity.
We confine ourselves to provision of highly spe-
cialised health care services, examples of which
might include organ transplantation, high tech-
nology neonatal care, and treatment of childhood
cancers, cystic fibrosis (CF), and chronic renal
failure. We assume there is a dedicated health care
budget for children, a portion of which will be set
aside for highly specialised services even though
resources are at present being directed away from
tertiary care. We further assume public policy
seeks to give content to children's constitutional
right to "basic health care services" by setting and
implementing priorities for a social minimum
which goes beyond essential primary health care.
We believe ours is a more rational approach to
distribution than the status quo rationing by
default, which is uneven and reflects arbitrary his-
torical and policy choices. Although our main
focus is macro-allocation, we mention moral con-
siderations that should inform micro-allocation.
Macro-allocation
PREVENTrIoN
The current, public policy emphasis on an essen-
tial primary health care package is the first rational
step towards achieving equity (as defined), or, in a
wider sense, equality of basic opportunities. It is a
policy that expresses a basic moral commitment to
primary prevention, amounting to a form of
triage" (a system of priority treatment to maxim-
ise the survival rate) on a national scale in the pre-
vailing socio-economic conditions, and given that
everything cannot be done at once.
Essential primary health care, which includes
maternal and child health services, offers the most
cost-efficient way of reducing much of the disease
burden among children without drastically in-
creasing public expenditure,'2 which, in turn,
safeguards children's basic opportunities to de-
velop their potential. Apart from costs incurred,
and initially these may be high, there would be
costs avoided, such as the future cost of treating
untreated disease and disability, as well as lost
productivity over the long term.3
NON-ABANDONMENT
Since not all disease is amenable to prevention
and acute management, on what rational basis
could one set priorities beyond primary health
care? Conversely, how do we value equally the lives
of children with acute, preventable conditions and
those with complex or long term, possibly
incurable, conditions?'5
We propose a basic moral and public policy
commitment to non-abandonment. As far as possi-
ble, no identified area of vital health care need
should be excluded. Health is a basic need and
highly specialised health care is an intermediate
need necessary for meeting that basic need.'6 In
terms of such a commitment, on a macro level
every child would have an equal chance to get the
health care services necessary to develop his or her
potential.
Non-abandonment takes seriously one of the
basic elements of a just health care system,
namely, fair distribution of the burdens of
rationing."7 18 As tertiary health care services are
cut, those with conditions that are expensive and
complex to treat carry an excessive burden. With-
out highly specialised health care services in the
public sector, these children will be denied access
to life-preserving and life-enhancing health care as
ability to pay becomes the sole criterion for
receiving health care only available in the private
sector. Since this would systematically disadvan-
tage the poorest children with special needs, it
would be a further breach of government policy.
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In addition to these underlying reasons of egali-
tarian justice (relating to equal individual rights,
equity, and fairness), there are good utilitarian
reasons for a commitment to non-abandonment
of highly specialised health care. It would promote
or benefit other elements of a just health care sys-
tem, such as effective health care education and
training, and the pursuit of high quality biomedi-
cal research.'8 As experience is gained in treating
expensive diseases and conditions, cost may well
be reduced, and much might be learned in the
process. '
Rationing formula
We propose the following, rationing or priority-
setting formula which might achieve non-
abandonment of highly specialised health care on
a macro level in a way that maintains a balance
between the different areas of vital health care
need and their distribution in the population.20
Ascertain the number of children in an identified
area of highly specialised health care, for example
CF, and multiply it by a unit cost (the cost of
standard medical treatment per child per year) to
determine the overall cost of treating children with
CF per year. Having done the same for other areas
of highly specialised health care, sum the costs for
all identified areas of care, express the total avail-
able health care budget for highly specialised
health care for children for a particular year as a
percentage of that sum, and fund each specialty
according to that percentage. In these circum-
stances non-abandonment serves the end of egali-
tarian justice by making provision for numbers in a
specific area of highly specialised health care need
in proportion to the incidence and prevalence of
that need among the population.
For various reasons, the methods of calculating
the cost of treatment would vary from one condi-
tion to another. We use a biomedical, specialty-
based model to estimate need as it most accurately
reflects de facto practice, although other ap-
proaches to estimation of need are possible.2"
However, without accurate national data on the
extent of met and unmet need for highly
specialised health care services, reliance on inter-
national incidence and prevalence rates would be
unavoidable in the short term.
Assume, for argument's sake, that only 55% of
overall required funding is available. Each area of
highly specialised health care would receive 55%
of funds needed. These funds would be chan-
nelled to the ten central hospitals offering highly
specialised health care, with allowances for
uneven geographical spread of patients within
specialties. Shortfalls will have to be accommo-
dated on an institution-based specialty or micro
level. However, these could be reduced in
different ways by macro-level measures, such as
reapportionment of the national budget to in-
crease the overall health care budget for children,
or using some of the funds generated by the intro-
duction of a national lottery.
The Department of Health's commitment to
good quality care requires that funds made avail-
able to specialties in central hospitals be used for
treatment that meets universal standards of highly
specialised medical care. Such a commitment
would preclude stretching resources to accommo-
date more than the number budgeted for on a
macro level on the basis ofnon-abandonment and
funding according to the proposed formula.
Would a policy based on non-abandonment
result in the best economic use of resources? In
South Africa, equality is a constitutionally man-
dated ideal, the realisation of which might require
using health care resources in ways that deliver
less rather than more benefit. Equality requires
that some resources be used to combat even the
most severe and costly disease and disability so
that every child has some chance to develop his or
her potential, and this means sub-optimal use of
resources in terms of maximising overall beneficial
outcome. This illustrates the fundamental norma-
tive tension between two basic moral values that
underlie distributive choices, namely equality and
wellbeing.22
Cost-effectiveness considerations
However, according to the government, children's
health care services must be cost-effective and
efficient. If this requires using scarce resources to
confer the most overall benefit or well-being (for
example, in the form of quantifiable extension of
life or improvement of quality of life), on the
greatest number, it will conflict with the govern-
ment's own commitments to equity or justice as
equality of individual opportunities. By contrast, a
commitment to non-abandonment, which sup-
ports the equitable provision of highly specialised
health care, will preclude allocation of total
resources in the most cost-effective way. In such
an approach, considerations of efficiency (defined
as "the attainment of the best outcome or result at
the lowest possible cost"),23 would be limited to
choices between different kinds of treatments for
the same conditions within specialties, and would
not underpin choices among services or
specialties.24 Cost-effectiveness gains are possible
through the use of marginally less effective, but
very much cheaper, treatments, although such
decisions may be controversial.25 At an institu-
tional level, cost-effectiveness should operate
through the concentration of specialty services
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that develop tested, efficient treatment pathways
and adopt sound managerial principles.26 Like-
wise, cost-effectiveness considerations require
that highly specialised health care, for example,
paediatric organ transplantation, be restricted to
some, or only one, central hospital.
A policy based on non-abandonment requires
the inclusion ofmost disease categories, regardless
of cost. But is it not more rational to give priority
to cheaper treatments that potentially provide
small benefits to many children rather than focus
on expensive treatments that potentially provide
large benefits to a few children, for the same over-
all expense? Weighting cost against other morally
relevant variables means that some health care
services should be channelled towards individual
high-cost/high-benefit treatments for small num-
bers of children.22 For some children with special
needs, this might be the only way to promote
equality of basic opportunities, given extreme
scarcity.
An example of such a commitment to non-
abandonment would be to regard some, non-
experimental, transplant surgery no differently
from other forms of expensive therapy. Indeed, a
thoughtful comparison of high treatment costs of
paediatric heart transplantation, CF, childhood
acute lymphoblastic leukaemia, and preterm care
for infants could find no moral justification for
arbitrarily excluding any particular treatment cat-
egory, simply because it was too expensive."5
"Why," the authors ask, "... should a child with
incurable heart disease be denied the chance of a
healthy childhood granted to others with similarly
devastating afflictions?", the cost of all being pro-
hibitively high.27 Moreover, given good survival
rates, heart, kidney and liver transplantation, in
the South African context, may be cost-effective
since it is cheaper to transplant these organs than
to treat patients repeatedly for complications of
chronic heart, kidney or liver disease.2" Treatment
of a relatively small number of children with
chronic diseases, although expensive, is justified
when cost is weighted against other morally
relevant considerations, such as equality of oppor-
tunity and non-discrimination, and individual
benefit.2
Medical futility
A commitment to non-abandonment also requires
treatment of severe disease and extreme disability.
Severity of disease is not, however, an absolute
moral consideration and, given scarcity and great
need, other morally relevant variables, such as cost
and beneficial outcome, must be balanced in the
pursuit of equality of basic opportunities.22
Therefore, we would not support treatment,
beyond comfort care, of a child whose clinical
condition is so severe that no beneficial outcome
whatsoever is likely. For example, aggressive treat-
ment, beyond comfort care, of an anencephalic
infant is futile by all generally accepted goals of
medicine, such as caring, healing or saving life.
Some might hold the extreme position that a goal
of medicine is to preserve life at all cost, even
physiological life with rudimentary or no con-
sciousness. We reject this view. However, all judg-
ments about medical futility are value-laden and
should not be used as a method of rationing care.29
Even a judgment about medical futility that
appeals to purely physiological outcomes is not
value-neutral but contains embedded normative
choices, for example, about the value of a life and
the goals of medicine.30
In sum, we believe our commitment to
non-abandonment is the best way to balance all
morally relevant considerations in a situation of
extreme health care need and resource scarcity. It
accommodates the formidable tensions that exist
between equality of basic opportunities and
achieving the most beneficial overall outcome, as
well as other tensions created by factors such as
cost, and prevalence and severity of disease.
Micro-allocation
Once a procedure is in place, on a macro level, to
prevent arbitrary exclusion of categories of highly
specialised care, it seems rational to use available
health care resources to generate the most
possible good, and this suggests a moral commit-
ment to maximise benefit or promote the most
beneficial outcome.
If we assume 45% underfunding for all special-
ties, and if specialties are funded according to the
proposed formula, then only 55% of identified
need in a specialty can be treated. Health care
professionals will have to decide which children
will receive highly specialised care that cannot be
provided to everyone who needs it. On what justi-
fiable moral basis could such exclusion be done on
a micro level, since the public system is designed
precisely to assist those without the ability to pay,
and since children present a special case and
should not be judged in terms of standards such as
previous contribution to society, effort, or prudent
planning?
We propose, within specialties, children be
selected, in the first instance, according to a "first
come, first served" (queuing) rule."1 This kind of
random selection aimed at addressing equity on a
micro level, in respect of children with equal need
for survival or adequate functioning, could be
made fairer by adopting corrective measures sen-
sitive to considerations such as access to care and
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geographical location. Does this mean that
patients already receiving treatment have absolute
priority over those who arrive later with more
urgent needs or better chances of success? We
believe not. For example, in a paediatric intensive
care unit (PICU), there may be times when a
child, with a more urgent need or a greater likeli-
hood of benefit, might need to displace a child
with a poor prognosis. Although admission to a
PICU establishes a presumption in favour of con-
tinued treatment, requirements of medical utility
sometimes justify early discharge to make room
for others with more urgent need or higher prob-
ability of benefit. This does not constitute
abandonment if alternative, more appropriate,
care is provided.3'
Queuing would provide a pool of potential
patients who, depending on the nature of their
condition, would need to meet a set of selection
criteria32 based on medical utility, defined as the
maximisation of the welfare of patients in need of
treatment. Where rationing is unavoidable, medi-
cal utility is justified because scarce resources
should only be distributed to individual children
with a reasonable chance of benefiting from them.
Failure to do so would result in a waste of scarce
resources.3' The development of explicit criteria
would also be in line with a recent constitutional
court ruling on access to life-prolonging re-
sources. According to the judgment:
" ... while each claimant seeking access to public
medical resources is entitled to individualised
consideration, the lack of principled criteria for
regulating such access could be more open to
challenge than the existence and application of
such criteria".33
Where medical utility is roughly equal between
children eligible for the same resource (for exam-
ple, a donor heart), we propose queuing, randomi-
sation or a lottery, whichever procedure is most
appropriate and feasible under the
circumstances.3' Here, where there are no obvious
differences among patients in terms of medical
need and likelihood of success, random selection
is justified on grounds of equity and equal evalua-
tion of lives.
On the micro level, because rationing decisions
are value laden, determination of medical utility
(including choice and weighting of patient selec-
tion criteria) will require constant medical and
public scrutiny. Significantly, the government
proposes periodic national health summits and
the formation of hospital committees to encour-
age public participation in the planning and
provision of health care services.34 However,
democratic debate about normative questions
such as fair rationing procedures will likely create
its own in-built tensions, as society is forced to
make tragic choices between individual lives and
the overall good, in other words to put a price on
life.22 Still, such debate would form part of an
honest, open and rational attempt to achieve
equitable rationing or egalitarian justice consist-
ent with the demands of a democratic constitu-
tion, and given the intractable combination of
extreme need, scarce resources, and the inevitabil-
ity of rationing exclusions.
Does micro-allocation mean many children
needing highly specialised health care will be
abandoned after all? At least on a macro level, a
policy based on non-abandonment should give
every child an equal chance to get the health care
necessary for developing basic opportunities, no
one being discriminated against on account of
factors beyond his or her control such as cost of
treatment, or incidence or severity of disease.
Importantly, non-abandonment, as proposed, will
make a material difference to where health care
resources are channelled. Therefore, a distribu-
tion policy premised on non-abandonment will
yield outcomes entirely different from other
possible approaches. For example, a straightfor-
ward overall cost-benefit approach would likely
result in the exclusion of whole categories of chil-
dren with special needs (for instance, those need-
ing organ transplantation) because resources
could be used more cost-effectively on children
elsewhere in the health care system. However, on
a micro level, given extreme need and scarcity,
rationing exclusions (and therefore tragic choices)
are inevitable. Still, we believe a policy based on
non-abandonment is the fairest way to give
concrete expression to the government's moral
and legal commitment to greater equality and
non-discrimination in the distribution of basic
health care services among children.
Conclusion
The principles of equality and equity, respectively
in the Bill of Rights and the white paper on health,
provide the moral and legal foundations for future
health care for children in South Africa. In reality,
extreme need and scarcity will seriously limit the
government's ability to fulfil its commitment to
equal health care rights for children, especially
their equal right to highly specialised health care.
To achieve equality of basic opportunities on
the macro level, we propose a national health
policy for children premised on the principles of
prevention and non-abandonment. We argue that
all effective highly specialised health care services
for children should be accommodated in the
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health care system. Apart from an egalitarian jus-
tification, it could be argued that abandoning
existing specialties would have adverse conse-
quences throughout the health care system and
that, once abandoned, they would be very costly to
resurrect. We reject grounding the macro-
allocation of health care resources on purely cost-
effectiveness calculations because they are indif-
ferent to equality of opportunity and equity.
Indeed, attaining equality on the macro level,
through non-abandonment, may require using
resources that deliver less rather than more overall
benefit. Non-abandonment also addresses the
formidable tensions in health care resource
allocation generated by considerations of equality
and utility, treatment costs, and severity and
prevalence of disease and disability. Whereas a
policy grounded in cost-benefit and cost-
effectiveness principles would likely result in
whole categories of highly specialised health care
being excluded because better outcomes for chil-
dren could be obtained elsewhere in the health
care system, non-abandonment on a macro level
would give most children with special needs an
equal chance of realising their potential.
Given extreme need and scarcity, it would not
be possible to provide highly specialised health
care services to all children who might benefit
from them, making rationing inevitable. To this
end, we propose that within each specialty,
children be selected on a "first come, first served"
basis. Thereafter, to promote the best use of
scarce resources with the least waste, children
should meet selection criteria based on medical
utility. Where medical need and probability of
success are roughly equal among eligible children
with similar conditions, equal evaluation of lives
requires selection according to an appropriate
form of random selection.
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